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Abstract
According to economic theory, the incidence of a unit tax is independent of the statutory
assignment of the liability to pay the tax. However, the theory is silent on the possible effects of
market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two
questions. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax to sellers or to
buyers? Is tax incidence independent of market institutions? We conduct laboratory experiments
with double auction and posted offer markets. Based on the results of nonparametric and
parametric tests of prices generated by laboratory markets, we conclude that the answer to both
questions is “no”. We report that observed differences from liability side equivalence are
statistically significant and economically meaningful. We also report that the incidence of the same
tax differs between double auction and posted offer markets with the same demand and supply
schedules.
Keywords: tax incidence, market institutions, experiment
JEL codes: C9, D4, H2
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Introduction
To understand the distributional effects of a tax, it is necessary to know who ultimately
bears its burden. The theory of tax incidence is concerned with answering this very question,
and there may not be a more important one in the field of public finance. According to the
liability side equivalence (LSE) hypothesis, the economic incidence of a unit tax is independent
of the statutory assignment of liability to pay the tax when markets are perfectly competitive.
Whether the tax is on the sellers or on the buyers in the market, the economic incidence of a tax
is hypothesized to depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand: the more inelastic of
the two bears the greater burden.1 Moreover, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that symmetric
markets satisfy LSE even when they are imperfectly competitive.
Since governments rarely change the statutory assignment of the liability to pay tax, there
are few opportunities to test the LSE hypothesis using observational data.2 However, there is a
growing literature showing that behavioral, informational, and institutional factors influence the
incidence of a tax.3 Markets need institutions to function. These institutions specify how buyers
and sellers interact to determine prices and quantities. Different market institutions are known to
have different price formation and quantity determination properties, and these properties may
affect the incidence and excess burden of taxes.4
Nevertheless, tax incidence theory does not specify market institution(s), so it is unclear
what form of market exchange may or may not exhibit LSE. Our central questions are whether
the predictions of the theory are consistent with data from exchange in laboratory versions of two
prominent market institutions, double auction (DA) and posted offer (PO) markets. To gain
insight into the effect of market institutions on tax incidence, we conduct experiments comparing
computerized DA and PO markets.
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The rules of the DA market in our experiments are a simplified version of those that
govern trading on the New York Stock Exchange and on many other stock, commodities, and
futures markets. An experimental DA market is open for a specified interval of time; buyers are
free to announce bid prices for the abstract commodity they wish to buy and sellers are free to
announce ask prices for the commodity they wish to sell. In the simplified DA markets used in
many experiments, including ours, each bid, ask, or contract is for a single unit. Actual trade
occurs when a seller accepts the most attractive bid price, or a buyer accepts the most attractive
ask price, among the outstanding bids and asks.
The rules of the PO market in our experiments resemble those that govern most of the
consumer goods markets in developed countries. Think, for example, of a supermarket or
department store. Sellers post prices for a commodity and may also limit the quantities they are
willing to sell to “stock on hand”. Buyers make the decision to buy or not to buy from alternative
sellers at their posted prices.5 The computerized PO markets in our experiments are simplified
versions of this field institution.
In addition to testing LSE, we also pose and attempt to answer a new question: Is tax
incidence independent of the market institution? In other words, for a given assignment of the
liability to pay tax, does tax incidence vary between market institutions? Given the current state
of tax-incidence theory, we continue to assume that tax incidence depends solely on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand. Applying this assumption in the current context implies that
tax incidence should be independent of market institutions, especially when markets are
symmetric. For ease of reference, we henceforth refer to this prediction as the independence of
market institutions (IMI) hypothesis. This question is not addressed in the previous literature on
tax incidence. This illustrates the fact that the public finance literature has not done an adequate
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job of grappling with the extensive literature on market institutions. Given the practical
importance of tax incidence to tax policy design, it is difficult to overstate the importance of
investigating the implications of market institutions for tax incidence.
Our baseline experimental design includes four treatments that use the same symmetric
supply and demand schedules: (1) a double-auction market with a unit tax on the buyer (DATB);
(2) a double-auction market with a unit tax on the seller (DATS); (3) a posted-offer market with
a unit tax on the buyer (POTB); and (4) a posted-offer market with a unit tax on the seller
(POTS). We report several nonparametric and parametric tests of the LSE and IMI hypotheses.
We also estimate Random Effects (RE) models with bootstrap clustered standard errors to test
these hypotheses. In the four baseline treatments described above, the tests reject both the LSE
and IMI hypotheses at conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, we report
evidence that deviations from LSE are economically meaningful for all but the DATB treatment.
We are not the first to propose testing the LSE hypothesis in a laboratory setting.
Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schedewald (1994), Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), Borck et
al. (2002), Riedl and Tyran (2005), and Ruffle (2005) test the LSE hypothesis in laboratory
settings using a variety of tax types and institutions. We provide a more elaborate review of the
literature in the Online Supplement. The study by Borck et al. (2002) most resembles our
approach. They test the LSE hypothesis in DA and PO markets, using a unit tax. They fail to
reject the LSE hypothesis for either market institution. They do not report whether tax incidence
differs between the two market institutions, which is one of our central questions. We compare
our findings with theirs in greater detail in the conclusion to this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
conceptual framework, and section 3 describes our experimental design and protocol. Section 4
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explains the baseline results. In section 5, we examine the robustness of our conclusions to
alternative experimental designs and discuss the external validity of our main results. Section 6
concludes.
Price formation in market institutions
DA and PO market institutions are known to have different price formation and quantity
determination properties. These differing properties may affect the incidence and excess burden
of taxes. Smith (1976b), Williams (1980), Smith et al. (1982), and Smith and Williams (1983)
report the robust result that DA markets converge rapidly to competitive equilibrium quantities,
thus exhausting the potential gains from trade. Although DA markets do not operate in the
manner described by the model of perfect competition, they do achieve the Pareto efficient
allocation of competitive market theory. Also, price convergence in DA markets with symmetric
demand and supply schedules is unbiased, neither converging consistently from above or below
(Smith and Williams 1982). Therefore, the DA market institution with symmetric demand and
supply schedules seems like a promising candidate to exhibit LSE.
Plott and Smith (1978), Williams (1980), Hong and Plott (1982), Smith (1982b), and
Ketcham, Smith, and Williams (1984) report that PO markets produce prices that converge to an
equilibrium, although not necessarily a competitive one, and also yield less efficient allocations
than DA markets. Consequently, PO markets may not exhibit LSE. PO exchange, however, is
the most common retail market institution in advanced market economies; thus, it is important to
investigate the effect of this market institution on tax incidence.
Finally, given the different efficiency and price-convergence properties of the DA and
PO market institutions, it would not be surprising if the data reject the IMI hypothesis.
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Experimental design and protocol
We proceed in this section by describing our experimental design and protocol; then we
discuss subject responses to the questionnaire and subject earnings in the four baseline
treatments.
Experimental design
Following Smith (1976a and 1982a), we induce stationary demand and supply functions
for a fictitious commodity. There are five sellers and five buyers in any given market. Each of
the five sellers is assigned a cost of twenty-three experimental dollars (ED) for unit 1, twenty-six
ED for unit 2, twenty-nine ED for unit 3, thirty-two ED for unit 4, thirty-five ED for unit 7, and
thirty-eight ED for unit 6. These marginal costs identify the induced individual supply schedules
used in the experiment. Each of the five buyers is assigned a value of fifty ED for unit 1, fortyseven ED for unit 2, forty-four ED for unit 3, forty-one ED for unit 4, thirty-eight ED for unit 5,
and thirty-five ED for unit 6. Figure A.1 in the Online Supplement illustrates the induced
demand and supply schedules used throughout every treatment reported in this study.
The symmetric market design is the discrete-variables analogue of a continuous-variables
model of a market in which the own-price elasticity of demand equals the own-price elasticity of
supply. The induced demand and supply schedules are symmetric in several ways. First, the
market demand and supply schedules create equal buyer and seller surpluses at the competitive
equilibrium quantity. This is important because unequal buyer and seller surpluses can produce
biased convergence paths even in a DA market (Smith and Williams 1982) and that may affect
tax incidence. Secondly, the symmetry of the market demand and supply schedules implies
equal demand and supply price elasticities. This supports clear tests of empirical incidence
compared to a theoretical prediction of equal sharing of the tax burden. A third way in which the
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design is symmetric is across individual buyers and sellers. Each buyer (respectively seller) has
a unit at each of the induced demand (respectively supply) prices. This provides equal payoff
incentives across all subjects in the experiment.
In the absence of a tax, the competitive equilibrium price tunnel is between thirty-five
and thirty-eight ED, and the unique competitive equilibrium quantity is twenty-five units,
consisting of five units traded by each of the five buyers and sellers. With a unit tax of twelve
ED, the competitive equilibrium price tunnel is between twenty-nine and forty-four ED, and the
unique competitive equilibrium quantity is fifteen units, consisting of three units traded by each
of the five buyers and sellers. The quantity reduction from twenty-five to fifteen units implies an
excess burden of the tax equal to sixty ED [= 5×(38 − 35) + 5×(41 − 32)].
To gauge the impact of market institutions on tax incidence, we change the type of
market institution from a DA to a PO market, keeping the assignment of the liability to pay tax
the same. Similarly, we change the assignment of the liability to pay tax from the seller to the
buyer, keeping the market institution the same, to gauge the impact of this change on the
incidence of a tax. The result is a two-by-two design with four treatment cells.
We conduct a total of four sessions, where each session is devoted to one of our four
treatment cells. At the beginning of each session, the subject’s role as a buyer or a seller is
randomly assigned by a computer and remains the same throughout the session. In each session,
four independent markets of the same type, consisting of five buyers and five sellers in each
market, are simultaneously trading. Each buyer and seller is given five (no-tax) infra-marginal
units to buy or sell at the beginning of each trading period, and there are thirty trading periods in
each of the four markets in a session. In short, the experiment uses a between-subjects design,
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with forty subjects randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller in equal numbers in each of
the four treatments, resulting in a total of 160 subjects.
Experimental protocol
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects read detailed instructions
appearing on their computer screens on how to interact with the computer to trade in the market.
After the subjects read the instructions, summary instructions are projected on a screen and read
to the subjects to increase understanding of the market participation process. (Subject
instructions are available at http://expecon.gsu.edu/jccox/subjects.html.) Before actual trading
periods begin, there are five practice trading periods. These practice periods acquaint the
subjects with the software and help them to understand the decision-making process. Subjects
are permitted to ask questions of the experimenter during written instruction and oral summary
parts of a session and during practice trading periods. After the practice periods, there are thirty
actual trading periods in each session. The total number of trading periods is not announced to
the subjects.6
Induced value and tax information given to subjects
In the four baseline treatments, subjects are given the same information about induced
marginal costs and values. Costs and values are private information. Throughout each session,
the subjects are seated in a manner that protects the privacy of this information. The amount of
the unit tax (twelve ED) and the assignment of the liability to pay tax are clearly stated in both
the detailed and summary subject instructions. The costs, values, and tax per unit remain the
same throughout each session.
The tax as well as costs and values are made salient to the subjects. A seller’s trading
screen shows “cost per unit” in one column and the “cost plus tax per unit” in an adjacent
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column.7 When the buyer is assigned the liability to pay the tax, the figures in these two
columns are identical because the unit tax on the seller is equal to zero. Similarly, a buyer’s
trading screen shows “value per unit” in one column and the “value minus tax per unit” in an
adjacent column. When the seller is assigned the liability to pay the tax, the figures in these two
columns are identical, because the unit tax on the buyer is equal to zero. Further details on the
exact layout of the buyer and seller trading screens are shown in the screen shots of the subject
instructions in the URL above. .
Double auction markets
Two baseline treatments are conducted with DA markets. In one baseline treatment, the
liability to pay tax is assigned to sellers and, in the other treatment, to buyers. The assignment of
the liability to pay tax is the only difference in the two baseline DA treatments. The unit tax in
both treatments is twelve ED. In both treatments, sellers and buyers are given two and a half
minutes to complete their transactions in each trading period. The time remaining in the trading
period, the subject’s own number of units available to buy or sell, own cumulative earnings, own
profit or loss from each traded unit, outstanding bid and ask prices in the market, tax charged per
unit, and the market transaction prices are displayed on the buyers’ and sellers’ trading screens
throughout a trading period. The bid, ask, and transaction price information provided on a
subject’s computer screen is a characteristic of the DA market institution in the field.
Posted offer markets
The remaining two baseline treatments are PO markets. In this market institution, sellers
make the first move by posting an offer price and the number of units they are willing to sell at
that offer price. Buyers then enter the market in a random queue, one by one, and accept the
sellers’ offers if they find them attractive. If an offer is accepted, then trade occurs. In one
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baseline PO treatment, the liability to pay the unit tax is assigned to sellers; in the other baseline
treatment, it is assigned to buyers. The assignment of the liability to pay tax is the only
difference between these two baseline treatments. Sellers have two and a half minutes to post
offers in each trading period. Each buyer has thirty seconds to accept (or not) one or more
available offers. The time remaining to make decisions, own number of units available to buy or
sell, own cumulative earnings, own profit or loss from each traded unit, and the unit tax are
displayed on the sellers’ and buyers’ trading screens throughout a trading period.
In the baseline treatments of the PO market, a seller’s trading screen only lists the offers
posted by oneself. Sellers are not able to see the offers posted by other sellers in the market. We
believe that this feature of the treatment best reflects the field institution that we are trying to
replicate in the laboratory. In retail markets, for example, the PO market institution itself does
not provide information on the prices posted by other sellers in the way that (bid and) ask prices
are publicly provided to all sellers (and buyers) in DA markets. While it is true that retail stores
can conduct price surveillance and market studies, conducting such studies makes the point that
the market institution itself does not provide pricing information to other sellers in the market.
As one of our robustness checks, which are discussed in Section 5, we also report the results of
PO treatments in which sellers observe the posted price-quantity pairs of other sellers. This
change in the experimental design has no effect on our conclusions.
Because our choice of the baseline information conditions for PO markets differs from
many PO market experiments reported in the existing literature, we provide a discussion of this
experimental design feature in the Online Supplement.
A buyer’s trading screen lists the number of units available for sale and the offer price
corresponding to each of these units as posted by the sellers. For further details on the trading
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screen’s presentation of information and layout, please refer to the screenshots in the subject
instructions in the URL above..
Subjects, questionnaire, and subject payments
At the end of each session, the subjects are asked to complete a short survey. The
subjects are mostly undergraduate students at a large urban university in the United States. They
are nearly equally divided among class ranks, with twenty-five percent freshmen, thirty-one
percent sophomores, twenty percent juniors, and twenty-two percent seniors. Masters students
make up the remaining two percent of the sample. Approximately seventy-five percent of the
subjects have previous experience in an experiment; fifty-nine percent are female; fifty-one
percent are African-American; twenty percent are white; and fifteen percent are foreign born.
The remaining fourteen percent are either Asian-American, Hispanic-American, or mixed race.
The average age in our sample is twenty years old; the minimum age is eighteen years old; and
the maximum age is twenty-four years old. Additional descriptive information about the subjects
is reported in Table A.1 in the Online Supplement.
After completing the survey, subjects are paid their cumulative earnings for all thirty
trading periods, using the conversion rate (one ED = $0.07) announced at the beginning of a
session. We pay subjects in a manner that prevents other subjects from observing their payment.
Table A.2 in the Online Supplement reports the minimum, average, and maximum earnings for
each of the four baseline treatments. The average earnings by treatment are DATS ($26.99),
DATB ($27.66), POTS ($20.12), and POTB ($20.79). Completing a session takes
approximately two hours; thus, average earnings exceed ten U.S. dollars per hour, which is a
favorable hourly wage rate for student subjects. Subjects also receive a five-dollar show-up fee
over and above their cumulative earnings from participation in a session.
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Analysis of the data from the baseline treatments
In the initial trading periods of a session, there is a lot of “noise” in the transaction price
series generated by a market, which reflects the price discovery process of the market institution.
However, this noise fades away by the 15th trading period. Once transaction prices converge to
an equilibrium (not necessarily a competitive one), subsequent transaction prices vary about the
equilibrium price. In short, our laboratory market experiments produce time series data.
Although we use a variety of nonparametric and parametric procedures for hypothesis testing, all
of them presuppose that the data across trading periods are independent. We conclude from a
variety of statistical tests, which are discussed in greater detail in the Online Supplement, that it
is appropriate to treat the time series generated by the last fifteen trading periods of our
laboratory market experiments as the sum of a constant and an independent white-noise process.
We interpret the expected value of the constant to be an equilibrium price. Following the
convention in the existing literature, we use the average buyer prices from each of the last fifteen
trading periods for hypothesis testing.8
Before turning to the discussion of our empirical results, we proceed below by describing
our data analysis strategy.
Data analysis strategy
We report results from several distinct tests to ensure that our reported conclusions are
robust to alternative statistical procedures. In addition to the Student’s t-test with unequal
variances, we report the results of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.9 The properties of these three nonparametric tests are described
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in the Online Supplement in greater detail. We proceed below by briefly describing a regressionbased test of the null hypotheses that are the focus of this research; then, we discuss our
empirical results.
We estimate the following RE model:
P̅ it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 T + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

(1)

The dependent variable in (1) is the average buyer transaction price for trading period t (=
16,…,30) of treatment i (= 1,…, 4 are the four treatments cells of the 2×2 design). In the test of
the LSE hypothesis, T=1 when the liability to pay the tax is on the buyer, and zero otherwise. In
the test of the IMI hypothesis, T=1 when the market institution is PO, and zero otherwise. The
random effect is designated by γt for the tth trading period; and εit is a stochastic error term. We
cannot make valid inferences using robust standard errors because Skewness-Kurtosis test rejects
the null hypothesis that the residuals from the four baseline RE regressions are normally
distributed. Therefore, we use bootstrap standard errors to improve inference. The bootstrap
distribution provides an almost exact approximation of the empirical distribution of the sample.
In addition, Cameron et al. (2008) show that bootstrap clustered standard errors improve
inference when there are a small number of clusters. Accordingly, we report p-values computed
with bootstrap clustered (at the market level) standard errors, using five thousand replications.
Results from the four baseline treatments
Now, we are ready to discuss our empirical results. We investigate two questions in this
research. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax for a given
market institution? Is tax incidence independent of the market institution, keeping the assignment
of the liability to pay the tax the same? The former question is the LSE hypothesis, and the latter
is the IMI hypothesis.
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We begin with a preliminary investigation of the data. Figure 1 consists of a set of four
paired bar graphs illustrating the difference in the average buyer prices produced by the last
fifteen trading periods from the four baseline comparisons of our two-by-two design.10 The
differences in the relative heights of the paired bars reflects the differences in the average buyer
prices of these pairwise comparisons. The results of the Student’s t-tests of the null hypothesis
of no difference in the averages of the buyer prices and the associated p-values for each
comparison are reported in Table 1. Since the Student’s t-test has the virtue of familiarity, we
use this test for our preliminary look at the data.
The LSE hypothesis predicts that tax-inclusive prices should be the same whether a tax is
placed on the buyer or the seller. We test this hypothesis for the DA market institution by
comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices produced by the DATB and DATS
markets. As reflected in the first pair of bar graphs of Figure 1, the difference in the averages of
the buyer transaction prices produced by these two markets is equal to 0.61 ED. The Student’s ttest of the null hypothesis of no difference in the averages of the buyer prices -- reported in panel
B1 of Table 1 -- is equal to 5.12 (p-value = 0.000). Thus, the data reject the LSE hypothesis at
conventional levels of statistical significance. This finding is rather surprising given the previous
discussion of the competitive equilibrium price-convergence properties of DA markets.
We also test the LSE hypothesis for the PO market institution. As reflected in the
relative heights of the second pair of bar graphs in Figure 1, the difference in the averages of the
buyer transaction prices produced by the POTB and POTS markets is equal to 0.79 ED. The
Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages of the buyer transaction prices is equal to 5.85
(p-value = 0.000), which is reported in panel B2 of Table 1. This test rejects the LSE hypothesis
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for PO markets at conventional levels of statistical significance. This finding is less surprising
given the previous discussion of the price-convergence properties of PO markets.
Now, we test the IMI hypothesis. Given the differences in the price-convergence
properties of DA and PO markets, we expect that that the data will reject this hypothesis. We
begin by testing the IMI hypothesis by comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices
produced by the DATB and POTB markets. As evident from the relative heights of the third pair
of bars in Figure 1, the difference for this comparison is equal to 2.15 ED. As reported in panel
B3 of Table 1, the Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages of the buyer transaction prices
is equal to 25.85 (p-value = 0.000). The data reject the IMI hypothesis for this comparison at
conventional levels of statistical significance. Finally, the difference in the averages of the buyer
transactions prices in the comparison of the POTS and DATS markets is 2.33 ED, which is
reflected in the difference in the heights of the fourth pair of bars in Figure 1. As reported in
panel B4 of Table 1, the Student’s t-test of no difference in the averages in the buyer transaction
prices from these two treatments is equal to 14.58 (p-value = 0.000). The data reject IMI for this
comparison at conventional levels of significance, as well.
The Student’s t-test assumes that buyer prices are normally distributed. If the buyer
prices are independent draws from a normal distribution, then this assumption would be justified.
However, Skewness-Kurtosis test rejects this hypothesis for the data produced by our four
baseline treatments. Therefore, inferences based on the Student’s t-test should be interpreted
with caution, suggesting the importance of the nonparametric tests that we report next.
Tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis
As before, we begin by examining the LSE hypothesis for DA markets by comparing the
average buyer transaction prices produced by the DATB and DATS treatments. The results of
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the MWW, KS, and RE model tests of the null hypothesis of no price difference are reported in
panel B1 of Table 1. The MWW test is equal to -5.800 and is statistically significant at
conventional levels. The data reject the null hypothesis that these two price series come from the
same population. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the LSE hypothesis. The KS
and RE-model tests also reject the LSE hypothesis for DA markets at conventional levels of
statistical significance.
The results of our tests of the LSE hypothesis for PO markets are reported in panel B2 of
Table 1. The MWW test is equal to -4.685 and is statistically significant at conventional levels.
Again, the data reject the null hypothesis that the POTB and POTS average buyer transaction
prices come from the same population. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the
LSE hypothesis. The KS and RE-model tests also reject the LSE hypothesis for PO markets at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
Tests of the independence of market institutions hypothesis
Now, we turn to our second question: Is the incidence of a tax independent of the type of
market institution, holding the assignment of the liability to pay tax the same. Initially, we test
the IMI hypothesis by comparing the averages of the buyer transaction prices produced by the
DATB and POTB markets from the final fifteen trading periods. The tests of this hypothesis are
reported in panel B3 of Table 1. The MWW test of -43.511 rejects the null hypothesis that these
two price-series come from the same population at conventional levels of statistical significance.
This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the IMI hypothesis. The KS and RE-model
tests also reject the IMI hypothesis for these two market institutions at conventional levels of
statistical significance.
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Finally, we test the IMI hypothesis by comparing the average buyer transaction prices
from the DATS and POTS markets. The results of the tests for this hypothesis are reported in
panel B4 of Table 1. The MWW test, which is equal to -9.316, rejects the null hypothesis that
these two price series come from the same population at conventional levels of statistical
significance. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the IMI hypothesis. The KS and
RE-model tests also reject the IMI hypothesis for these two market institutions at conventional
levels of statistical significance.
In sum, the data generated by our baseline treatments soundly reject the LSE hypothesis
for both the DA and PO market institutions using a variety of tests. Similarly, the data rejects the
IMI hypothesis for the DATB and POTB treatments as well as the DATS and POTS treatments
using a variety of tests.
Are the observed differences economically meaningful?
We report ample evidence rejecting the LSE and IMI hypotheses. Although the price
differences discussed above are statistically significant at conventional levels using a variety of
tests, it is also important to examine whether these differences are economically significant.
We use several measures of economic significance. We compare the proportions of the
total tax revenue paid by buyers and sellers in the four baseline treatments and, in Table 2, we
report the average quantities, average excess burdens, excess burden as a proportion of tax
revenue, and excess burden as a proportion of participant earnings using the data generated by
the last fifteen trading periods for each of the four baseline comparisons.
Since we use a symmetric design, the theory of tax incidence predicts that the tax burden
will be equally shared between buyers and sellers. We use the average value of the buyer
transaction prices from the last fifteen trading periods from all four markets of the DATB
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treatment to identify an equilibrium price. As discussed in greater detail below, the average
quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units at
conventional levels of significance, and fifteen units is the post-tax equilibrium quantity
predicted by the theory for the induced demand and supply schedules. This justifies using the
average buyer transaction price from the DATB treatment for hypothesis testing. We then use
this equilibrium price to determine the incidence of the tax in each of our treatments. In the
DATB treatment, fifty percent of the tax burden is borne by buyers and fifty percent by sellers in
the DATB treatment. In the DATS markets, 55.1 percent of the tax revenue of 180.4 ED is
borne by buyers and 44.9 percent by sellers. In contrast, 67.9 percent of the tax revenue of 133.6
ED is borne by buyers and 32.1 percent by sellers in the POTB markets. The burden of the tax is
even further shifted onto buyers in the POTS markets. In this case, 74.5 percent of the tax
revenue of 124.8 ED is borne by buyers and 25.5 percent by sellers. Table A.3 of the Online
Supplement reports average buyer prices and tax burdens as a percent of total tax revenues for
the baseline treatments. Clearly, these differences in tax incidence among the four treatments are
economically meaningful.
Now, we turn to the analysis of excess burdens. In columns one through four and rows
one through four of Table 2, we report whether the average quantity and average excess burden
from the last fifteen trading periods are equal to the theoretical values of fifteen units and sixty
ED, respectively, for each of the four baseline treatments. The average quantities reported in
Table 2 are consistent with the observed differences in tax shifting documented in Table 1. The
average quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units,
which is the post-tax equilibrium quantity predicted by the theory, at conventional levels of
significance. Furthermore, the average excess burdens from the DATB treatments are
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statistically indistinguishable from sixty ED at conventional levels of significance, and sixty ED
is the predicted value for a competitive equilibrium. In the DATS treatment, the average quantity
is 15.03, which is statistically indistinguishable from the competitive equilibrium quantity of
fifteen at conventional levels of significance. However, the average excess burden is 63.85 ED,
which is statistically different from the theoretical value at conventional values of significance.
In contrast, the average quantities and excess burdens are strikingly different from the values
predicted by competitive equilibrium in the POTB and POTS treatments. The average quantity
and average excess burden are statistically different from fifteen units and sixty ED, respectively,
at conventional levels of significance. Table 2 also shows that there are stark differences in
excess burdens as a share of tax revenue and as a share of participant earnings among these
treatments.
In short, the data generated by the DATB treatment are consistent with the theory of tax
incidence in symmetric markets as this treatment replicates the theoretical values of equilibrium
quantity and excess burden. Using this treatment as the benchmark, we find substantial
differences in the average prices and quantities as well as the excess burdens as a share of
participant earnings among the other three baseline treatments.
In sum, contrary to the predictions of the LSE hypothesis, we report evidence that tax
incidence is not independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax nor is it independent of
the market institution. We also find that these differences are economically meaningful for all
but the DATB market institution.
Robustness tests using alternative experimental designs
We now ask whether our conclusions about the LSE and IMI hypotheses are robust to
changing two features of our experimental design. One feature is the information provided to
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subjects in PO markets. The second feature is the across-sessions treatment design in which
market institution and liability to pay tax both vary across sessions.
We now provide sellers with posted prices and quantity limits (henceforth price-quantity
information) of competing sellers in the PO markets. We also control for possible session effects
by varying the liability to pay tax across markets within sessions of both DA and PO markets.
This creates eight additional treatment cells.
We begin by changing the price-quantity information provided to sellers in PO markets.
In contrast to the low-information, baseline PO treatments in which sellers cannot observe the
posted price-quantity information of other sellers, we now allow sellers to observe the pricequantity information posted by the other sellers in PO markets. We refer to the latter as the high
information treatment. As in the baseline treatment, we allow four POTB markets to trade
simultaneously in one session and four POTS markets to trade simultaneously in another session.
The result of this pairwise comparison is reported in column two of the uppermost panel of Table
3. As in the baseline treatment, all four tests reject the null hypothesis of no price difference in
the comparison of POTB and POTS markets. Therefore, we reject the LSE hypothesis at
conventional levels of significance for PO markets when sellers can observe the price-quantity
information of other sellers in the market.
Next, we control for potential session effects by allowing two POTB and two POTS
markets to trade simultaneously in the same session. We conduct this treatment providing low
information as in the baseline treatments and high information as in the alternative treatment that
we just discussed in the previous paragraph. The results of these treatments are reported in
column two of the middle and lowermost panels, respectively, of Table 3. Again, we reject the
LSE hypothesis at conventional levels of statistical significance with all the tests, with two
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exceptions. The MWW and the RE-model tests fail to reject the LSE hypothesis when the PO
treatments are run simultaneously in the same session with low information.
We also report measures of economic significance for these alternative treatments in
Table 2 and Table A.3 of the Online Supplement. The average quantities and average excess
burdens created by the markets in the alternative PO treatments are statistically significantly
different from the theoretical values of fifteen units and sixty ED, respectively, at conventional
levels of significance.
Turning to the DA markets, we control for session effects by allowing two DATB and
two DATS markets to trade simultaneously during the same session.11 The results of this
experimental design are reported in column three of the lowermost panel of Table 3. Both the
MWW and Student’s t-test reject the null hypothesis of no price difference, but the KS and RE
model tests fail to reject the LSE hypothesis. In these two cases, the average quantities and
average excess burdens are not statistically distinguishable from the values predicted by theory at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
Now we turn to the alternative treatments for the IMI hypothesis, the results of which are
reported in Table 4. There are six additional comparisons for this hypothesis. The tests reported
in the top, middle, and bottom panels show that our baseline conclusions rejecting the IMI
hypothesis are robust to the two alternative experimental designs considered here.
Comparison to previous literature and external validity
Our conclusions differ from those of Borck et al. (2002) who fail to reject the hypothesis
of liability side equivalence (LSE) with data from their posted offer (PO) markets. The
discrepancy between their conclusions and ours may reflect differences in our respective
experimental designs and protocols. However, it may also reflect differences in our respective
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statistical procedures. As we have explained, our conclusions are based on several
nonparametric and parametric tests. Their conclusions are based solely on a test for statistical
significance of a liability-treatment dummy variable from a random-effects, panel-data
regression model using transaction prices from the last six rounds of their experiment (Borck et
al. 2002, pg. 680).
They generously provided us with the data from their PO treatments. Using transaction
prices from the last six rounds of these data, we replicated the summary statistics reported in
Table 1 of their paper and their significance test which fails to reject the LSE hypothesis at
conventional levels of statistical significance. However, we are not able to replicate the exact
magnitude of the RE estimator reported in their paper. We begin our analysis of their statistical
procedures by computing the Skewness-Kurtosis test for normality of the distribution of the
residuals from the RE model that we estimated using their data. This test rejects normality of the
error distribution at a p-value of 0.06, which suggests inference from a Student’s t-test of the
estimated coefficient may not be valid and should be interpreted with caution. Additionally, we
estimated bootstrapped clustered (at the market level) standard errors of an RE model using their
data. The resulting p-value is equal to 0.063. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects LSE (pvalue = 0.016) as does the Student t-test with unequal variances (p-value = 0.045). The MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test weakly rejects LSE with their data (p-value = 0.085). Furthermore, if the
LSE hypothesis is empirically valid then it should be equally likely that the average observed
price with liability on the seller would be greater or less than the average observed price with
liability on the buyer. Inspection of the data reported in Table 1 of the Borck et al. paper reveals
that the average buyer transaction prices with buyer liability (POTB) are greater than the average
prices with seller liability (POTS) in every round of the final six periods which they use for
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hypothesis testing. The nonparametric sign test rejects the LSE hypothesis (p-value = 0.016).
We conclude that the Borck et al. PO data reject LSE at conventional levels of statistical
significance.
We conclude this section with a brief comment on the external validity of our results.
We report evidence of greater tax shifting in the POTS treatments, which is consistent with
econometric evidence of tax shifting in the analogous field institution. Hanson and Sullivan
(2009) use the occasion of a one dollar per pack increase in the cigarette excise tax in Wisconsin
to estimate the incidence of a tax on cigarettes. They report evidence that the tax increase is over
shifted: the price per pack increases by $1.08 to $1.17 as result of a one dollar increase in the
cigarette excise tax. Harris (1987) and Keeler et al. (1996) also report similar evidence of over
shifting of cigarette excise taxes, using state level data for multiple states. Finally, Besley and
Rosen (1999) examine the incidence of state sales taxes. They report evidence of full shifting of
the tax for many commodities and over shifting for more than half of them. It is interesting to
find field evidence that is broadly consistent with the evidence from our laboratory POTS market
treatments.
Concluding remarks
We analyze data from an experiment designed to examine two important questions
regarding tax incidence. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax
in either a double auction market or a posted offer market? Is tax incidence independent of the
market institution existing in the taxed market? We report robust evidence that the assignment
of the liability to pay tax, holding the market institution the same, and the type of market
institution, holding the assignment of the liability to pay tax the same, both have a statistically
significant effect on the incidence of a tax in the two market institutions examined in this study.

24

We find that these differences in incidence are economically meaningful in almost all
comparisons. We report robust conclusions that hypotheses of (a) liability side equivalence and
(b) independence of market institutions can be rejected with data from our experiments.
Given the prominence of the LSE hypothesis in the public finance literature and the
practical importance of tax incidence for tax policy design, we believe that our central findings
that tax incidence depends on both assignment of liability to pay and on the existing market
institution in the taxed market merit further study.
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Table 1. Four baseline tests a
Test statistics
Student’s t-test with unequal variances
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT)
(with bootstrap standard errors)

Test statistics

Baseline tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis
B1: DATB versus DATS
B2: POTB versus POTS
Number of observations =
Number of observations = 120
120
-5.116***
-5.852***
-5.800***
-4.685***
0.617***
0.433***
-0.610*

-0.790**

Baseline tests of the tax-incidence equivalence of market
institutions hypothesis
B3: DATB versus POTB
B4: DATS versus POTS
Number of observations =
Number of observations = 120
120
-25.850***
-14.580***
-43.511***
-9.316***
0.983***
0.917***

Student’s t-test with unequal variances
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT)
2.149***
2.329***
(with bootstrap standard errors)
a
* Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent
level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level.
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Table 2. Average quantities and excess burdens a

Treatment

Average
quantity
(Units)b

1.

Double auction, tax on buyer, four
15.10
markets trading in one session.
2. Double auction, tax on seller, four
15.03
markets trading in one session.
3. Posted offer, tax on buyer, low
information, four markets trading in
11.13***
one session.
4. Posted offer, tax on seller, low
information, four markets trading in
10.40***
one session.
5. Double auction, tax on buyer, two
15.17
markets trading in a mixed session
6. Double auction, tax on seller, two
15.17
markets trading in a mixed session
7. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high
13.45***
information, four markets trading
8. Posted offer, tax on seller, high
13.53***
information, four markets trading
9. Posted offer, tax on buyer, low
information, two markets trading in a
10.70***
mixed session with row 10
10. Posted offer, tax on seller, low
information, two markets trading in a
11.77***
mixed session with row 9
11. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high
information, two markets trading in
13.87***
mixed session with row 12
12. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high
information, two markets trading in
13.13***
mixed session with row 11
a
*** statistically significant at the one-percent level.
b

Average
excess
burden
(ED)c

Excess
burden as a
percent of
tax revenue

Excess
burden as a
percent of
participant
earnings

60.82

33.44

21.91

63.85***

35.39

23.65

134.70***

100.82

64.78

147.40***

118.11

73.26

61.20

33.62

22.26

62.40

34.28

22.93

86.25***

53.44

33.34

88.40***

54.45

34.95

142.00***

110.59

67.38

120.70***

85.46

52.34

79.7***

47.89

31.16

91.40***

58.01

35.72

Tests of the null hypothesis that the quantity is equal to fifteen units, which is the value

predicted by the theory.
c

Tests of the null hypothesis that the excess burden is equal to sixty ED, which is the value

predicted by the theory.
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Table 3. Robustness tests of the liability side equivalence hypothesis a
Experimental design
POTB vs. POTS
1. High information - different sessions
Number of observations = 120
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample
4.803***
test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
0.450***
Estimated coefficient from RE model
0.374***
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances
10.139***

DATB vs. DATS
-

b

c

2. Low information - same session
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample
test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances

Number of observations = 60

-

1.619

-

0.333***

-

0.296

-

5.365***

-

3. High information - same session
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample
test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model
(βT) (with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances

Number of observations = 60

Number of observations = 60

-5.566***

-1.671*

0.700***

0.300

-0.378***

-0.170

-7.497***

-2.483**

a

* Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent

level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level.
b

This is the baseline test of the liability side equivalence hypothesis for DA markets, which is

reported in the panel labelled B2 in Table 3. These tests are repeated here for ease of
comparison.
c

The DA market institution by nature is a high information environment. Therefore, the low

information attribute is not applicable here.
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Table 4. Robustness tests of the tax-incidence equivalence of market institutions hypothesis a
Experimental design
DATB vs. POTB
DATS vs. POTS
1. Posted offer market is high information; DA and
Number of
Number of
PO markets traded in separate sessions
observations = 120
observations = 120
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test

-9.448***

-6.523***

Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT)
(with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances

1.000***

0.567***

1.941***

0.957**

-56.057***

-11.434***

Number of
observations = 60

Number of
observations = 60

Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test

-6.654***

-6.653***

Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT)
(with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances

1.000***

1.000***

2.261***

1.795***

-30.554***

-29.087***

Number of
observations = 60

Number of
observations = 60

Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two-sample test

-6.210***

-6.653***

Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test
Estimated coefficient from RE model (βT)
(with bootstrap standard errors)
Student’s t-test with unequal variances

0.933***

1.000***

1.290***

1.498***

-16.983***

-38.360***

2. Posted offer market is low information; DA and
PO markets traded in the same session

3. Post-offer market is high information; DA and
PO markets traded in the same session

a

* Statistically significant at the ten-percent level; ** statistically significant at the five-percent

level; and *** statistically significant at the one-percent level.
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Figure 1. Pair-wise comparisons of average buyer prices, using the last 15 trading periods
of each market session
45

44.73

44.73

44.5
43.94

44
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42.4

42.5
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41.79

42

41.79

41.5
41
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DATS & DATB

POTS & POTB

POTB & DATB

POTS & DATS

Notes: DATB = double auction market with tax on buyer.
DATS = double auction market with tax on seller.
POTB = posted offer market with tax on buyer.
POTS = posted offer market with tax on seller.
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Notes
1

Taxes could also be shifted backward onto the factors of production.

2

An exception is Saez et al. (2012) who test the LSE hypothesis using data from change in the

assignment of the liability to pay the payroll tax in Greece. Their data is not consistent with LSE.
3

Using a laboratory experiment, Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) test the “Mill hypothesis” that the

burden of an indirect tax may differ from that of a direct tax because the latter is more visible or
salient. In a study using a field experiment and observational data on gasoline and liquor sales,
Chetty et al. (2009) report evidence that tax salience has an impact on tax incidence. Finkelstein
(2009) reports that salience influences the elasticity of demand for tolled roads. Morone and
Nemore (2015) examine tax salience in a laboratory setting. They report that in tax-on-seller
treatment prices are systematically greater, thus revealing a plausible tax-shifting phenomenon.
4

See, for example, Ketcham, Smith, and Williams (1984), Plott and Smith (1978), Hong and

Plott (1982), Smith (1982b), and Ketcham et al. (1984).
5

Buyers choosing quantities at the posted prices does not, in itself, mean that buyers must be

price takers. Buyers can withhold demand to try to get sellers to post lower prices in subsequent
market periods. Buyers may, however, choose to fully reveal demand at posted prices.
6

In “commodity” double auctions such as ours, announcing or not announcing the end period is

unlikely to affect trading. In contrast, in an asset double auction in which there can be price
bubbles, this design feature can influence the price determination process.
7

Chetty et al. (2009) defines “tax salience” to buyers as display of the gross-of-tax price (as we

do in our experiment.
8

Interestingly, if we use all the observations, rather than collapsing the observations into average

prices for each trading period, our conclusions remain the same.
9

Henceforth, we will refer to Student’s t-test with unequal variances as simply Student’s t-test.

10

The choice of buyer or seller prices has no bearing on inferences drawn from the data. The

difference between the buyer price and the seller price is always equal to the unit tax of twelve
ED. Comparisons across the four treatments would be the same if done with seller prices.
11

By its very nature, DA markets provide high information on the price offers of other sellers in

real time. Therefore, we cannot vary this feature of the experimental design for DA markets.
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Introduction
In this Online Supplement to “Tax Incidence: Do Institution Matter? An Experimental
Study,” we provide a more thorough review of the literature; a figure illustrating the induced
supply and demand schedules (Figure A.1) and a related discussion; a description of the sample
and subject payments and related tables (Tables A.1 and A.2); a more elaborate description of
the data generating process that motivates our approach to hypothesis testing and a related figure
(Figure A.3); a discussion of the information conditions used in laboratory posted offer markets;
and a discussion about whether the observed differences among our treatments are economically
meaningful and a related table (Table A.3).
Literature review
We are not the first to propose testing the LSE hypothesis in a laboratory setting.
Kachelmeier, Limberg and Schedewald (1994), Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), Borck et
al. (2002), Riedl and Tyran (2005), and Ruffle (2005) test the LSE hypothesis in laboratory
settings using a variety of tax types and institutions. Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) test
the LSE hypothesis by imposing a tax on either the proposer or the responder in a one-stage
ultimatum bargaining game. They contend that the LSE hypothesis should hold in a tax version
of the ultimatum game as long as the fairness norm threshold below which offers are rejected
remains unaffected by a change in liability to pay the tax. They reject the LSE hypothesis with
ultimatum game data at conventional levels of significance.
Riedl and Tyran (2005) test the LSE hypothesis, using a gift-exchange game, with a PO
market for labor. They contend that LSE should hold in gift-exchange games when gross wages
adjust to changes in taxes and market participants are exclusively concerned with net-of-tax
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profits and wages. Riedl and Tyran do not reject the LSE hypothesis at conventional levels of
significance.
Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schedewald (1994) use an experimental design with two
interrelated DA markets, three types of agents (customers, retailers, and wholesalers), and three
tax instruments (an ad valorem tax levied on customers, a turnover tax levied on retailers, and a
value-added tax levied on wholesalers and retailers). In their experiment, there are ten periods
without a tax followed by ten periods with a tax. They do not reject the LSE hypothesis at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
Borck et al. (2002) test the LSE hypothesis in PO markets, using a unit tax. In their
experiment, there is no tax in the first twelve periods of a session followed by a unit tax in
periods thirteen through twenty-four. They conduct ten sessions with PO markets and two
sessions with DA markets. They do not reject the LSE hypothesis for either market institution.
However, they do not report whether tax incidence differs between the two market institutions,
which is one of our central questions.
Ruffle (2005) tests the LSE hypothesis for taxes and subsidies. He uses a pit market
where at least eight pairs of buyers and sellers participate in all experiments.11 There is no tax or
subsidy in the first eight periods of a session. In periods nine to nineteen there is a tax or subsidy
on either the buyers or the sellers. Ruffle’s tests do not reject the LSE hypothesis for either
subsidies or taxes.
Our experimental design differs from much of the existing literature in a number of
important ways. First, our induced supply and demand schedules are symmetric both at the
aggregate market level and the individual agent level. As Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show, LSE
is independent of the market structure – perfectly or imperfectly competitive – when markets are
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symmetric. Therefore, we use a symmetric design to test the LSE hypothesis in two prominent
market institutions. Second, we introduce a unit tax in the initial trading period and maintain that
tax throughout all thirty trading periods. Third, we present the buyers and sellers with
information that makes the tax salient (see section 4.3 in the printed text). Fourth, in addition to
testing the LSE hypothesis for two market institutions, we also pose and attempt to answer a new
hypothesis: is tax incidence independent of the market institution. Fifth, we calculate the excess
burden due to the unit tax for each of the four comparisons that result from our two-by-two
design to gauge whether the observed differences in tax shifting are economically meaningful.
Sixth, we use a variety of statistical tests and conduct a variety of robustness checks.
Induced Demand and Supply Schedules
Following Smith (1976a and 1982a), we induce stationary demand and supply functions
for a fictitious commodity. Figure A.1 of this Online Supplement illustrates the induced demand
and supply schedules used in every treatment reported in this study. More specifically, there are
five sellers and five buyers in any given market. Each of the five sellers is assigned a cost of
twenty-three experimental dollars (ED) for unit 1, twenty-six ED for unit 2, twenty-nine ED for
unit 3, thirty-two ED for unit 4, thirty-five ED for unit 7, and thirty-eight ED for unit 6. These
marginal costs identify the induced individual supply schedules used in the experiment. Each of
the five buyers is assigned a value of fifty ED for unit 1, forty-seven ED for unit 2, forty-four ED
for unit 3, forty-one ED for unit 4, thirty-eight ED for unit 5, and thirty-five ED for unit 6.
Information condition in laboratory posted offer markets
Our choice of the baseline information conditions for PO markets differs from many PO
market experiments reported in the existing literature. We proceed below with a discussion of
this experimental design feature.
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In the baseline treatments of the PO market, a seller’s trading screen only lists the offers
posted by oneself. Sellers are not able to see the offers posted by other sellers in the market. We
believe that this feature of the treatment best reflects the field institution that we are trying to
replicate in the laboratory. In retail markets, for example, the PO market institution itself does
not provide information on the prices posted by other sellers in the way that (bid and) ask prices
are publicly provided to all sellers (and buyers) in DA markets. While it is true that retail stores
can conduct price surveillance and market studies, conducting such studies makes the point that
the market institution itself does not provide pricing information to other sellers in the market.
The original question posed in this article is whether tax incidence varies across market
institutions given the information that is provided by the institutions themselves. This focus on
the information-generating properties of a market institution reflects the view articulated by
Smith (1982c). The DA market institution produces public information on bid prices, ask prices,
and transaction prices. This is a feature of the market institution, itself, both in the laboratory and
in organized exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange. In contrast, the PO market
institution, itself, does not provide all of this information. With the PO market institution,
information on competitors’ prices would have to come from some (possibly costly) activity −
such as market surveillance − that is distinct from own-price posting and exchange in the market.
The literature has been unclear on this point. Early PO market experiments were run in
classrooms using a blackboard and chalk (Williams 1973); thus, there was no practical
alternative to displaying all posted prices to all subjects, regardless of whether they were buyers
or sellers.
When it subsequently became possible to run computerized PO experiments, authors
recognized that there was a choice to be made about whether to exhibit seller’s posted prices to
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their competitors (Ketchum, Smith, and Williams 1984, p. 599). For reasons that are not clear in
the literature, a common procedure in many computerized PO experiments is to reveal competing
sellers’ prices, even though this is not an inherent feature of the PO market institution. As one of
our robustness checks, which are discussed in section 5 of the printed version of the paper, we
also report the results of PO treatments in which sellers observe the posted price-quantity pairs of
other sellers. This change in the experimental design has no effect on our conclusions. In sum,
the present paper rejects the LSE hypothesis in PO markets; this finding is robust to the two
alternative ways of implementing the PO market institution discussed above in a symmetric
induced valuation environment.
Subjects, questionnaire, and subject payments
At the end of each session, the subjects are asked to complete a short survey. Descriptive
information about the subjects is reported in Table A.1 of this Online Supplement. The subjects
are mostly undergraduate students at a large urban university in the United States. They are
nearly equally divided among class ranks, with twenty-five percent freshmen, thirty-one percent
sophomores, twenty percent juniors, and twenty-two percent seniors. Masters students make up
the remaining two percent of the sample. Approximately seventy-five percent of the subjects
have previous experience in an experiment; fifty-nine percent are female; fifty-one percent are
African-American; twenty percent are white; and fifteen percent are foreign born. The
remaining fourteen percent are either Asian-American, Hispanic-American, or mixed race. The
average age in our sample is twenty years old; the minimum age is eighteen years old; and the
maximum age is twenty-four years old.
After completing the survey, subjects are paid their cumulative earnings for all thirty
trading periods, using the conversion rate (one ED = $0.07) announced at the beginning of a
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session. We pay subjects in a manner that prevents other subjects from observing their payment.
Table A.2 in the Online Supplement reports the minimum, average, and maximum earnings for
each of the four baseline treatments. The average earnings by treatment are DATS ($26.99),
DATB ($27.66), POTS ($20.12), and POTB ($20.79). Completing a session takes
approximately two hours; thus, average earnings exceed ten U.S. dollars per hour, which is a
favorable hourly wage rate for student subjects. Subjects also receive a five-dollar show-up fee
over and above their cumulative earnings from participation in a session.
Data generating process: what is an observation?
The properties of the data produced by our laboratory experiments should inform our
approach to hypothesis testing. Our laboratory market experiments produce time series data.
There is a lot of “noise” in the price series in the initial trading periods in a market, which
reflects the price discovery process of the market institution. As we show, however, this noise
fades away by the 15th trading period. Once transactions prices have converged to an equilibrium
(not necessarily a competitive one) subsequent transaction prices vary about this observed
equilibrium price. In other words, the data generating process of our market experiments can be
characterized as a moving average (MA) process. To make matters more concrete, a qth order
MA process, denoted MA(q), is characterized as:
Pt = Pa + εt + θ1εt-1 + θ2εt-2 + … + θqεt-q.

(1)

Pt is the observed transaction price for the tth trade (after the 15th trading period); Pa is the
average of all observed transaction prices preceding the tth trade; and εt is assumed to be a whitenoise process or a sequence {εt} whose elements have mean zero and finite variance σ2.
Economic theory does not provide much guidance on the statistical properties of εt. In
fact, an equilibrium price is not generally thought of as a random variable in the theoretical
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literature. If, however, a price series produced by our laboratory markets converges to an
equilibrium, the resulting random variable is said to be ergodic for the mean which implies that it
is a covariance-stationary process or θs < 1 for all s (= 1,…,q).11 Furthermore, if, after a
sufficient number of trading periods, these observed transaction prices converge to an
equilibrium and, in the words of Paul Samuelson (1993), “vibrate randomly”, then εt should be
an independent white-noise process. This implies that θs = 0 for all s (= 1,…, q).11 Lacking
theoretical support for such an assumption, we rely on empirical evidence to guide us.
Figure A.2 in the Online Supplement shows the plots of the autocorrelation functions of
the transactions prices for the last fifteen trading periods for each of our four baseline treatments.
The estimated autocorrelations in each of the four plots are well within the ninety-five percent
confidence intervals, except for the first autocorrelation in the POTS treatment (see Figure A.2d).
This autocorrelation is statistically significant at the five-percent level. We also conduct runs
tests of serial independence using the last fifteen trading periods from the sixteen baseline
markets. These tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of serial independence in fourteen out of the
sixteen cases at the ten-percent significance level. Pooling the market data by treatment, the runs
tests are equal to -1.26 (p-value = 0.21) for the DATB price series; 1.07 (p-value = 0.29) for the
DATS price series; -0.59 (p-value = 0.55) for the POTB price series; and -0.01 (p-value = 1.00)
for the POTS price series. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of serial independence in all
four cases.
Based on the totality of the statistical evidence, we believe that it is appropriate to treat
the price series from the last fifteen trading periods in our laboratory market experiments as the
sum of a constant and an independent white-noise process. We interpret the expected value of the
constant to be an equilibrium price. This implies that observed individual transaction prices
43

(from the final fifteen trading periods) can be used in hypothesis tests. Nonetheless, we follow
the convention in the existing literature and use the average buyer prices for each of the last
fifteen trading periods.11 However, and this is an important point, the statistical tests employed
in this research, and discussed in greater detail below, assume that the data are independent. We
cannot reject this hypothesis for our data.
The Student’s t-test compares two samples by assuming there is no difference in the
sample means. It computes a p-value for the null hypothesis that the sample means are equal by
further assuming the samples are independent draws from a normal distribution.11 This property
of the Student’s t-test is too restrictive in the current context because Skewness-Kurtosis tests
reject the null hypothesis that the data generated by our laboratory market experiments are
normally distributed at conventional levels of significance.11 In contrast, the Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon (MWW) test compares two samples consisting of independent draws from a
population by first ranking all the values from the two samples in ascending order, and then
computes a p-value that depends on the discrepancy between the mean ranks of the two samples.
In this sense, it is similar to a Student’s t-test; however, this nonparametric test requires no
assumption about the distribution of the data. The intuition behind the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test is straightforward. If two samples are independent draws from the same population, the
two empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) should be reasonably similar. The KS
test computes a p-value for the largest discrepancy between the two CDFs. If the maximum
discrepancy is substantial in a statistical sense, the investigator can conclude that there is a high
likelihood that the samples come from two different populations. Like the MWW test, the KS
test is also nonparametric and requires no assumption about the distribution of the data.
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Are the observed differences economically meaningful?
Since we use a symmetric design, the theory of tax incidence predicts that the tax burden
will be equally shared between buyers and sellers. We use the average value of the buyer
transaction prices from the last fifteen trading periods from all four markets of the DATB
treatment to identify an equilibrium price. As discussed in greater detail below, the average
quantity in the DATB treatment is statistically indistinguishable from fifteen units at
conventional levels of significance, and fifteen units is the post-tax equilibrium quantity
predicted by the theory for the induced demand and supply schedules. This justifies using the
average buyer transaction price from the DATB treatment for hypothesis testing. We then use
this equilibrium price to determine the incidence of the tax in each of our treatments.
Table A.3 of this Online Supplement reports average buyer prices and tax burdens as a
percent of total tax revenues. In the DATB treatment, fifty percent of the tax burden is borne by
buyers and fifty percent by sellers in the DATB treatment. In the DATS markets, 55.1 percent of
the tax revenue of 180.4 ED is borne by buyers and 44.9 percent by sellers. In contrast, 67.9
percent of the tax revenue of 133.6 ED is borne by buyers and 32.1 percent by sellers in the
POTB markets. The burden of the tax is even further shifted onto buyers in the POTS markets.
In this case, 74.5 percent of the tax revenue of 124.8 ED is borne by buyers and 25.5 percent by
sellers. Clearly, these differences in tax incidence among the four treatments are economically
meaningful.
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Table A.1. Demographic characteristics of the full sample of the baseline treatments
Baseline Treatments
Double Auction
Posted Offer

Variable

Percent buyers
Percent freshmen
Percent sophomore
Percent juniors
Percent seniors
Percent Masters students
Percent with experience in experiments
Percent female
Percent African-American
Percent Asian-American
Percent Hispanic-American
Percent mixed race
Percent white
Percent foreign born
Average age
Standard deviation of age
Minimum age
Maximum age
Percent business administration majors
Percent economics majors
Percent other majors
Percent with at least 1 economics course
GPA between 1.25 and 2.74 (percent)
GPA between 2.75 and 3.24 (percent)
GPA between 3.25 and 3.74 (percent)
GPA between 3.75 and 4.0 (percent)
Not taken courses with grades (percent)
Number of experimental subjects

48

Full

Tax on
seller

Tax on
buyer

Tax on
seller

Tax on
buyer

50
25
31
20
22
2
76
59
51
4
2
8
20
15
20
2
18
24
28
6
0
55
9
29
39
19
4
160

50
15
30
28
25
3
78
55
48
3
5
10
23
13
20
2
18
24
25
0
0
53
8
48
30
10
5
40

50
30
30
10
30
0
78
68
43
0
3
8
25
23
20
2
18
24
28
5
0
58
5
28
35
30
3
40

50
30
30
23
18
0
75
63
58
5
0
10
20
8
20
1
18
24
43
3
0
58
13
25
45
13
5
40

50
25
35
20
15
5
73
50
58
8
0
5
13
18
20
1
18
23
18
15
0
53
13
18
45
23
3
40

Table A.2. Earnings in U.S. dollars, for the baseline treatments
Baseline Treatments
Double auction

Earnings
Full

Minimum Earnings

tax on
seller

tax on
buyer

Posted offer
tax on
seller

tax on
buyer

$6.75

$14.25

$16.75

$9.25

$6.75

Average Earnings

$23.89

$26.99

$27.66

$20.12

$20.79

Maximum Earnings

$40.75

$38.75

$35.25

$40.75

$38.50
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Table A.3. Average buyer prices and tax burden as a percent of tax revenue
Treatment

Average buyer
price
(ED)

Total tax
revenue
(ED)

Proportion of
the tax revenue
paid by the
buyer
(percent)

Proportion of
the tax revenue
paid by the
seller
(percent)

1.

Double auction, tax on buyer, four
41.8
181.2
50.0
50.0
markets trading in one session.
2. Double auction, tax on seller, four
42.4
180.4
55.1
44.9
markets trading in one session.
3. Posted offer, tax on buyer, low
information, four markets trading in one
43.9
133.6
67.9
32.1
session.
4. Posted offer, tax on seller, low
information, four markets trading in one
44.7
124.8
74.5
25.5
session.
5. Double auction, tax on buyer, two markets
42.1
182.0
52.9
47.1
trading in a mixed session with row 6
6. Double auction, tax on seller, two markets
42.3
182.0
54.3
45.7
trading in a mixed session with row 5
7. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high information,
43.7
161.4
66.2
33.8
four markets trading in one session
8. Posted offer, tax on seller, high information,
43.3
162.4
62.9
37.1
four markets trading in one session
9. Posted offer, tax on buyer, low information,
two markets trading in a mixed session
44.4
128.4
71.7
28.3
with row 10
10. Posted offer, tax on seller, low information,
two markets trading in a mixed session
44.0
141.2
68.8
31.2
with row 9
11. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high
information, two markets trading in
43.4
166.4
63.7
36.3
mixed session with row 12
12. Posted offer, tax on buyer, high
information, two markets trading in
43.8
157.6
66.8
33.2
mixed session with row 11
Notes: The estimates reported above are based on the data from the last fifteen trading periods of each
treatment. The average buyer and seller prices from the DATB treatment are used as the baseline to
calculate the incidence of the other three treatments. Figures reported in the table are rounded to first
decimal place.
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2. Online Figures

Figure A.1. Induced demand and supply schedules
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Figure A.2. Autocorrelation plots for the baseline treatments (last fifteen trading periods)

a) Double auction market with tax on buyer

b) Double auction market with tax on seller

c) Posted offer market with tax on buyer

d) Posted offer market with tax on seller
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